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David Orentlicher1
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UNILATERAL ORDERS IN A SEPARATED AND SHARED POWER SYSTEM
(STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2017). PP. 256. HARDCOVER $65.
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
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MARTIN H. REDISH, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION: A DEMOCRATIC PARADOX (STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
2017). PP. 272. HARDCOVER $55.

INTRODUCTION
Our political system is failing us. Public trust in the national government has
plummeted,2 partisan conflict and gridlock have intensified,3 and extremist views are
gaining traction.4 We have a president who is more interested in fueling the flames than
in putting them out. As dysfunction in Washington increases, many observers fault our
constitutional structure. Clearly, things are neither working well, nor working as intended
by the founding fathers.5
But there is disagreement about the nature of the problem, or even whether there is
a problem at all. As some observers point out, our economy is thriving, and our system of
checks and balances ultimately contains rogue elected officials, as in the case of President
1. Cobeaga Law Firm Professor, UNLV William S. Boyd School of Law. MD, JD, Harvard University. I
am grateful for the comments of Judy Failer and the editorial assistance of the Tulsa Law Review editors.
2. Public Trust in Government: 1958-2017, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 14, 2017), http://www.peoplepress.org/2017/12/14/public-trust-in-government-1958-2017/.
3. NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF
IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 1, 175 (2006).
4. David French, On Extremism, Left and White, NAT’L REV. (May 30, 2017),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/05/political-violence-extremism-portland-muslim-woman-left-right-altright/.
5. The Framers did not want partisan factions to be able to gain control of governmental power, as can
happen for either the Democratic or Republican Party. DAVID ORENTLICHER, TWO PRESIDENTS ARE BETTER
THAN ONE: THE CASE FOR A BIPARTISAN EXECUTIVE 100–03 (2013).
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Richard Nixon and Watergate. Sure, there is much dysfunction in Washington, but politics
is messy, as in the sausage-making analogy,6 and alternative constitutional systems could
be much worse.
Other observers argue that it’s a serious problem when the minority can too easily
thwart the majority. In this view, the constitutional structure fails because of the many
ways that a political minority can obstruct—or gain control of—the political process. The
Electoral College allows for the selection of presidents who receive fewer popular votes
than their opponents, 7 and U.S. Senators from the twenty-six smallest states can form a
majority even though they represent only eighteen percent of the U.S. population. 8 A
powerful special interest, such as the National Rifle Association, can block legislative
reforms favored by most of the public. The minority also can employ filibusters or other
legislative veto points in the U.S. Senate, field successful nominees in gerrymandered
congressional districts, or spend vast amounts of money on candidates or ballot initiatives.
In addition, the political minority might suppress voter eligibility and turnout enough to
prevail in elections.
To repair our constitutional structure, many observers would have us reinforce
majority rule by denying the minority its ability to frustrate the public’s will. Thus, for
example, advocates for a stronger majority have pursued litigation and promoted state
constitutional reform to address the problem of partisan gerrymanders. Last year,
challenges to partisan gerrymanders reached the U.S. Supreme Court from Maryland,
North Carolina, and Wisconsin,9 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court required a redraw of its
state’s congressional districts,10 and voters in five states cast ballots on referenda to curb
partisan gerrymandering.11 Some reformers want more sweeping reform. They go so far
as to urge adoption of a British-like parliamentary model in which the majority party
6. According to John Godfrey Saxe, “Laws, like sausages, cease to inspire respect in proportion as we know
how they are made.” Fred R. Shapiro, Familiar Words from Unfamiliar Speakers, N.Y. TIMES July 20, 2008, at
MM16.
7. Many presidents have received less than fifty percent of the popular vote, and some have received fewer
votes than their major party opponent. ORENTLICHER, supra note 5, at 172; Steven Porter, Clinton Wins US
Popular Vote by Widest Margin of Any Losing Presidential Candidate, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Dec. 22,
2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2016/1222/Clinton-wins-US-popular-vote-by-widest-marginof-any-losing-presidential-candidate.
8. David Wasserman, Why Even a Blue Wave Could Have Limited Gains, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/20/opinion/midterms-democrats-republicans-blue-wave.html.
9. Compare Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (remanding to a Wisconsin district court to allow
plaintiffs to argue for standing), and Rucho v. Common Cause, 138 S. Ct. 2679 (2018) (remanded to a North
Carolina district court for full consideration of standing issue), with Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018)
(upholding the denial of a preliminary injunction in Maryland). The Maryland and North Carolina cases will be
heard again by the Court in 2019. Adam Liptak, Two Gerrymandering Cases Added to the Docket, N.Y. TIMES
Jan. 4 , 2019, at A13.
10. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2018).
11. Ohio voters approved the state’s proposal in the May 2018 primary. Michael Wines, Are Voting Districts
Drawn Unfairly? States Are Letting Voters Decide, N.Y. TIMES July 23, 2018, at A11. Voters in Colorado,
Michigan, Missouri, and Utah approved their states’ initiatives in November 2018. Robert Gherke, Passing Prop.
4 Was a Step Toward Better Government, but Now Voters Have to Hold Leaders Accountable, SALT LAKE TRIB.
(Nov. 24, 2018), https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2018/11/24/gehrke-passing-prop-was/; Katie Zezima &
Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, National Voters Are Stripping Partisan Redistricting Power from Politicians in Antigerrymandering Efforts, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/voters-arestripping-partisan-redistricting-power-from-politicians-in-anti-gerrymandering-efforts/2018/11/07/2a239a5ee1d9-11e8-b759-3d88a5ce9e19_story.html?utm_term=.e4f4482c53fe.
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exercises the executive and legislative powers jointly, and in which a new majority can
bring down the government immediately rather than waiting for the next election cycle to
do so.12
In an important alternative view, the problem is not that the minority exercises too
much power; rather the problem with our constitutional system lies in giving too little
power to the minority. 13 The U.S. political system has many “winner-take-all” features,
especially with the high stakes election for the presidency. Whoever prevails in the battle
for the White House gains one hundred percent of the executive power even if the victor
triumphs by the barest of margins. Our winner-take-all system denies meaningful
representation to half of the public in the most important policymaking office in the world,
and as a result, we invite levels of competition and conflict that are intense, excessive, and
harmful to social welfare.14 Campaigns for the Oval Office are bitter and costly, and they
are followed by obstructionist tactics from the losing party so it can retake the
presidency.15 During the Obama administration, Republican members of Congress
pursued a policy of obstruction to regain power, and Democratic legislators generally line
up against President Trump’s initiatives. 16 Similarly, the Tea Party formed within weeks
of President Obama’s inauguration,17 and the Resistance began before President Trump
took office.18 Instead of a system where elected officials seek common ground to promote
the overall public good, they give higher priority to their battle for power.
Winner-take-all politics suffers from another serious defect. When policy is made
on the basis of only one side’s perspective, ill-advised decisions are much more likely.
Studies of decision making demonstrate that better outcomes emerge when policies are
based on a diversity of viewpoints. 19
Winner-take-all politics also infects the judicial branch. Although the Supreme
Court typically includes a mix of conservative and liberal Justices, one side or the other
will enjoy a majority, and the ability of a conservative or liberal majority to impose its
perspective creates the same kinds of problems as a single executive who imposes a
Democratic or Republican perspective. Members of the public who share the views of the
Court minority lack meaningful representation on many important issues, the judicial
appointment process has become highly politicized as each side fights for a Court majority,

12. JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 18–20 (Rev. ed. 1992)
(citing advocates for a parliamentary system while urging more incremental reforms).
13. David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 YALE L.J. 548 (2009); David Orentlicher, Political
Dysfunction and the Election of Donald Trump: Problems of the U.S. Constitution’s Presidency, 50 IND. L. REV.
247, 255–62 (2016).
14. ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY: HOW MORE AND MORE
AMERICANS COMPETE FOR EVER FEWER AND BIGGER PRIZES, ENCOURAGING ECONOMIC WASTE, INCOME
INEQUALITY, AND AN IMPOVERISHED CULTURAL LIFE 4 (1995).
15. ORENTLICHER, supra note 5, at 2, 96–97.
16. Some members of Congress will break with their party to vote their district or state. For example, Senator
Joe Manchin from West Virginia often votes with President Trump. Tracking Congress in the Age of Trump,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 10, 2018), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/congress-trump-score/joe-manchin-iii/.
17. Michael Ray, Tea Party Movement, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Tea-Party-movement (last updated Oct. 5, 2018).
18. Tim Dickinson, Meet the Leaders of the Trump Resistance, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 13, 2017),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/meet-the-leaders-of-the-trump-resistance-124691/.
19. ORENTLICHER, supra note 5, at 146–48.
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and we increase the risk of ill-advised decisions.20
To address winner-take-all politics, rather than looking to the U.K. as a model, we
should look to Switzerland, where power is shared across partisan lines, and elected
officials from both sides of the political spectrum have a say in the making of
governmental policy.21 And we are seeing some interest in Congress in a more bipartisan
ethic. For example, a “Problem Solvers Caucus” of Republican and Democratic members
of the House is promoting reforms that would make for a more bipartisan process in their
chamber.22
Or maybe the real problem is the development of the “imperial presidency.” 23 Over
many decades, presidents have accumulated considerable power, both through
congressional delegation and presidential pushing of boundaries. Thus, for example, even
though the Constitution assigns to Congress the power to declare war, 24 multiple
presidents have committed our military to battle without congressional authorization. 25
And even though the Constitution assigns to Congress the power to “regulate commerce
with foreign nations,”26 President Trump imposed tariffs on Canada, China, and other
countries in 2018.27 Critics of the imperial presidency urge Congress and the Supreme
Court to restore an appropriate balance of power in the national government. 28
This essay reviews three books that analyze different features of the U.S. political
system. Where do they come down on the problems with our constitutional structure?
Would they reinforce the majority, enhance the power of the minority, reduce presidential
power, or do something else?
In the Dual Executive, Michelle Belco and Brandon Rottinghaus study executive
authority and consider the question whether presidents exercise their authority without
sufficient constraint.29 Do we really have a problem of an imperial presidency? 30 Belco
and Rottinghaus conclude that existing checks and balances are adequate to protect the
public interest.
In The Federal Judiciary, Richard Posner targets a number of problems with the
judicial branch, and he has many ideas to improve the way judges judge. 31 But when it

20. David Orentlicher, Politics and the Supreme Court: The Need for Ideological Balance, 79 U. PITT. L.
REV. 411, 411–12 (2018). Congress has been insulated to an important extent from winner-take-all politics
because of the filibuster rule in the Senate. While one party can exercise control in the House with a bare majority
of seats, control of the legislative process in the Senate requires a supermajority of 60 to break filibusters. Until
recently, the minority party in the Senate also could mount filibusters in response to judicial nominations.
21. ORENTLICHER, supra note 5, at 116–18.
22. Melanie Zanona, Problem Solvers Caucus Has a Vision: A Bipartisan House, THE HILL (July 24, 2018),
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/398700-problem-solvers-caucus-has-a-vision-a-bipartisan-house.
23. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. coined the term “imperial presidency” during the Nixon Administration, and
popularized it in a book. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
24. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
25. ORENTLICHER, supra note 5, at 55.
26. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
27. Ana Swanson, U.S. to Put Tariffs on Its Key Allies, Risking Reprisal, N.Y. TIMES May 31, 2018, at A1.
28. ORENTLICHER, supra note 5, at 76, 80.
29. See MICHELLE BELCO & BRANDON ROTTINGHAUS, THE DUAL EXECUTIVE: UNILATERAL ORDERS IN A
SEPARATED AND SHARED POWER SYSTEM (2017).
30. Id. at xiii.
31. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES (2017).
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comes to constitutional failures, he generally trusts the Supreme Court to make needed
adjustments through its ability to interpret the Constitution in light of contemporary
realities.
In Judicial Independence and the American Constitution, Martin Redish also would
rely on the Supreme Court’s authority to interpret the Constitution, and he suggests some
specific ways for the Court to reinforce its ability to exercise its checking and balancing
role.32
UNILATERAL EXERCISES OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
In their book, Belco and Rottinghaus explore two concerns about the U.S. political
system—first, the use of executive orders by presidents to act unilaterally and upset the
balance of power between the White House and Capitol Hill,33 and second, how partisan
politics influences the extent to which presidents act independently. 34
The book brings original empirical evidence to bear on the use of executive orders,
and it looks at the factors that might influence the extent to which presidents use their
executive powers to shape national policy on their own and the extent to which they work
more collaboratively with Congress. As the authors observe, intuition, anecdotal
examples, and previous research suggest a number of expectations. For example, one
would predict that presidents are more likely to act independently when Congress is
controlled by the other party and assumes an obstructive posture. When President Obama
was unable to persuade Congress to enact immigration reform, he adopted his DACA and
DAPA programs over the objections of the House Republican majority. 35 On the other
hand, presidents are more likely to work in conjunction with Congress when Capitol Hill
is controlled by their own party, and the executive and legislative branches are able and
willing to work collegially. After Congress passed the Affordable Care Act, President
Obama used his executive order power to implement provisions of the Act. 36
Overall, several significant findings emerge, some as one would predict, and others
not so expected. First, when legislation gives presidents broad discretion to act, they take
advantage of it, as with decisions about natural resources and public lands. Between 1891
and 1906, after passage of the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, successive presidents
established national forests on eighty million acres of land.37 Presidents also have
exercised their broad authority under the 1906 Antiquities Act to designate national
monuments, with more than 125 such designations since the Act’s enactment. 38
32. See MARTIN H. REDISH, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A DEMOCRATIC
PARADOX (2017).
33. BELCO & ROTTINGHAUS, supra note 29, at 8–9.
34. Id. at 13.
35. Id. at 3, 56. Under DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals), the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) exercises its discretion to not deport undocumented immigrants with respect to those who entered
the United States when they were younger than age 16 and satisfied several measures of good conduct. Batalla
Vidal v. Duke, 295 F. Supp. 3d 127, 137 (E.D. N.Y. 2017). Under DAPA (Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents), DHS stays deportation for certain parents of U.S. citizens and
lawful permanent residents. Id. at 138.
36. BELCO & ROTTINGHAUS, supra note 29, at 4–5.
37. Id. at 38.
38. Id. at 40, 48, 139.
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Second, presidents are more likely to act independently on matters of foreign policy
than on matters of domestic policy. 39 Indeed, starting with the Korean War, presidents
more often than not have launched military interventions without congressional
authorization, as with Presidents Clinton in Bosnia, Obama in Libya, and Trump in
Syria.40
The data are less clear when it comes to whether presidents make unilateral policy
decisions during the earlier or later years of their terms in office. While one might expect
presidents to act more independently as they reach the end of their terms, the evidence is
mixed. Sometimes they do, other times they do not. 41 But once presidents reach the very
end of their tenure in office, they are more likely to act independently. 42
The data also present a mixed picture when it comes to ideological differences
between the president and Congress. As mentioned, one would expect presidents to act
more independently as the strength of the opposing party in Congress grows. If a
Republican president faces Democratic majorities in the House and/or Senate, it will be
very difficult to advance a policy agenda via the legislative process. Therefore,
independent action via executive orders should increase. However, things are more
nuanced than this simple relationship between partisan opposition and independent action.
If the opposition has a strong and united majority in Congress, its ability to push back on
the president, or seize the policy making initiative, can deter independent action designed
to bypass the legislative branch. Hence, the authors not only consider the partisan
affiliation of the congressional majority but also its strength and cohesiveness. Is the
congressional majority small and fragmented and therefore in a weaker position to block
presidential preferences (or implement its own preferences), or is it large and unified, and
therefore in a stronger position to impose its will? 43
In studying the connection between presidential independence and ideological
differences with Congress, Belco and Rottinghaus found inconsistent evidence. For
example, when presidents employ executive orders to achieve their policy goals before
Congress has a chance to act on an issue, presidents are more likely to strike as the
ideological distance increases between the president and the Senate filibuster pivot 44 or
when the parties are ideologically fragmented and therefore less able to muster majorities
to pass bills.45 These findings make sense. In both cases, presidents are more likely to
achieve their goals through unilateral action than through legislation. On the other hand,
presidents are less likely to move first as polarization in the House and Senate increases.46
This result seems surprising since a more polarized Congress should make for a more

39. BELCO & ROTTINGHAUS, supra note 29, at 37–38.
40. ORENTLICHER, supra note 5, at 55; Charlie Savage, Was Missile Attack on Syria Illegal? Explaining
Presidential War Powers, N.Y. TIMES Apr. 7, 2017, at A11.
41. BELCO & ROTTINGHAUS, supra note 29, at 108, 134, 162.
42. Id. at 162.
43. Id. at 71–73.
44. Id. at 113. Since a filibuster can block legislative action, bills often need support from sixty Senators
rather than a simple majority. The Senate filibuster pivot refers to the ideology of the Senator who would be 60th
in terms of ideological distance from the president.
45. BELCO & ROTTINGHAUS, supra note 29, at 113–17.
46. Id. at 113.
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gridlocked Congress, and we would expect presidents to turn to independent action. 47
Even more surprising is that the data flip once the legislative process is underway.
If a president does not like the direction in which a bill is headed, the president might try
to preempt the legislation with a unilateral policy. Thus, for example, when President
Reagan disliked a bill that would have imposed sanctions on South Africa, he issued an
executive order establishing policy on the matter. 48 In this context, presidents are not more
likely to preempt Congress when the parties are ideologically fragmented and they are less
likely to do so as the ideological distance increases with the Senate filibuster pivot. But
presidents are more likely to preempt when the parties are polarized. 49 Why executive
interest in collaboration would change once the legislative process progresses is not clear.
Perhaps there are important factors that are not being measured.
Overall, what do we learn from the quantitative analysis? In exercising their
unilateral powers, presidents clearly are sensitive to their political and constitutional
constraints.50 They often work collaboratively with Congress, and they often invoke their
statutory authority rather than their constitutional authority. 51 Still, quantitative analyses
cannot give us a complete picture. Do presidents draw the right balance between
collaborative and independent action? When they act independently, are they acting
wisely? Are they respecting their constitutional limits? For example, were President
Obama’s immigration orders and President Trump’s bombing of Syria constitutional?
To answer these questions, complementary qualitative research is important. It is
easy to envision very different reasons for independent presidential action. For example, a
president’s policy might be legally accomplished through either legislation or executive
order, and the president would prefer a legislative path to insulate the policy from reversal
by a later administration.52 But if legislation is not feasible, then the president would use
an executive order, and that would be legitimate.
An alternative scenario comes out differently. Suppose a president’s policy could be
accomplished legally only through legislation, and again, it’s not a feasible route. If the
president tried to implement the policy through an executive order, that would not be
legitimate. Critics have argued that President Obama’s DAPA order fell into this
category,53 while supporters view it as an example of action that could have been
accomplished by legislation or executive order.
Of course, assessing the constitutionality of White House policy can be
challenging—the lines between legitimate and illegitimate presidential action are hotly
contested. Nevertheless, not all executive orders will fall close to the line, so a qualitative
analysis would be informative.

47. BELCO & ROTTINGHAUS, supra note 29, at 113.
48. Id. at 126.
49. Id. at 137–39.
50. Id. at 175, 180.
51. Id. at 75–76.
52. BELCO & ROTTINGHAUS, supra note 29, at 179.
53. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit deemed it unconstitutional. See Texas v. United States,
809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). The U.S. Supreme Court deadlocked 4-4 on the question. See United States v.
Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016).
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THE JUDICIAL BRANCH IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
While Belco and Rottinghaus look at presidential power in the constitutional
structure, the other two books focus on the role of the judiciary. And in both cases, a key
goal for the authors is to ensure that the judiciary can effectively play its checking and
balancing role.
On judging
Richard Posner’s book, The Federal Judiciary, covers considerable ground. After
decades on the bench, he has many useful things to say about what judges do well and
what they do not do so well. And he also has valuable things to say about many of the
academic debates on the judicial process.
In particular, Posner is frank about the way he decided cases. The approach of a
Posnerian judge is “not to worry initially about doctrine, precedent, and the other
conventional materials of legal analysis, but instead to try to figure out the sensible
solution to the problem or problems presented by the case.” 54 If the sensible solution is
not blocked by an authoritative Supreme Court precedent or some other binding authority,
the Posnerian judge goes with the sensible solution.55 Why, writes Posner, should judges
look “backwards” at precedent, text, or legislative history that reflect the context of their
times and that could not anticipate the future? Judges should render the decision that is
best for today’s society.56 In this approach, precedent, text, and drafting history can be
marshalled to support the court’s decision, but they do not dictate the outcome. 57
This is not only the preferred way of deciding for Posner, in his view, it’s inevitable.
Text and drafting history simply cannot provide sufficient guidance. As he illustrates with
the First Amendment, it’s not possible to deduce the Supreme Court’s free speech doctrine
from the Constitution’s prohibition on laws that abridge the freedom of speech. While
Congress “shall make no law” limiting the right to speak, lots of laws do so, including
laws against defamation, child pornography, threats to inflict harm, copyright
infringements, etc.58 And exactly what counts as speech? Should we include other kinds
of communication, such as music and art (yes, says Posner) or the burning of flags or books
(maybe not, writes Posner). 59 The process of constitutional “interpretation” requires
judges to create law in much the same way that they have created the common law. 60 In
the end, judges decide cases based on their political leanings and other philosophical
attitudes because they have no choice.61 In other words, Posner is a legal realist.
All of this makes good sense, and Posner bolsters his analysis with perceptive
critiques of alternative theories.62 But he doesn’t always follow through on the

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

POSNER, supra note 31, at 80.
Id.
Id. at 82.
Id.
Id.
POSNER, supra note 31, at 82.
Id. at 87–88.
Id. at 87–88, 148–50.
See id. at 98–112.
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implications of a process of judging that is heavily driven by the political leanings of the
judges. For if the judicial branch is supposed to rise above politics, how can it do so when
the Supreme Court will usually have either a conservative or liberal majority and favor
either conservative or liberal positions? Other countries take steps to ensure ideological
balance in the decisions of their courts. 63 In Posner’s view, it is impossible to depoliticize
judging, so we should aim for higher quality appointments to the judiciary and better
training of law students.64 For the most part, Posner has faith in the current constitutional
structure65 and believes that a more effective judiciary will provide the necessary check
on the executive and legislative branches. We just need to have better qualified appointees
who do a better job of judging and managing court operations. Posner does, however,
endorse one constitutional change that would address the ideological bias on the Supreme
Court. He likes the idea of requiring approval of Supreme Court nominees by a two-thirds
vote rather than a simple majority. That way, nominees would have to appeal to senators
on both sides of the aisle.66
As mentioned, Posner covers a lot of ground. He discusses important concerns such
as judicial ethics and judicial diversity. On the ethics, he worries about judges who retain
investments in individual stocks rather than switching to mutual funds 67 or who
plagiarize—that is, they use language from briefs in their opinions without attribution. 68
With regard to diversity, he would like to see more judges with practice backgrounds, with
training in the sciences and social sciences, and with political or business experience. 69
Posner believes that legislatures should decriminalize almost all drug use, 70 that
jurors and judges should ignore witness demeanor cues because of their unreliability, 71
and that trial courts should make greater use of neutral experts. 72 He also thinks that
appellate court judges who lack experience as a trial court judge should periodically
preside over trials, as he did.73 He critiques the length of prison sentences and limits on
the right to habeas corpus,74 the various standards of appellate review that often obfuscate
more than illuminate,75 and the quality of judicial opinion writing (too verbose, too much
legalese).76
Other targets include class action settlements that reward the class’ lawyers much
more than the members of the class,77 forum-selection and mandatory arbitration clauses

63. Orentlicher, supra note 20, at 417-18.
64. POSNER, supra note 31, at 150.
65. Id. at 165.
66. Id. at 215. This reform would follow a common European approach and could easily be extended to the
lower courts. Orentlicher, supra note 20, at 417, 424.
67. POSNER, supra note 31, at 210–11.
68. Id. at 98.
69. Id. at 214.
70. Id. at 298.
71. Id. at 287–88.
72. POSNER, supra note 31, at 283–86.
73. Id. at 280–81.
74. Id. at 293–297, 420–26.
75. See id. at 239–73.
76. See id. at 223–26.
77. POSNER, supra note 31, at 363–70.
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in agreements between businesses and individual consumers, 78 and the excessive attention
paid to citation formatting and the time it wastes for law review members who spend more
time on adherence to Bluebook rules than to the substance of the articles they edit.79 Posner
also dislikes insincere paeans to legal luminaries, as with the effusive encomiums upon
Justice Antonin Scalia’s death.80
Of course, breadth can come at the expense of depth. For many of his topics, Posner
provides a quick take rather than an extended analysis.
Judicial checking and balancing
While Posner’s book focuses on judicial practice, Martin Redish writes in Judicial
Independence and the American Constitution about the importance of judicial review and
its critical role in our constitutional structure. As he observes, our constitutional democracy
rests primarily on a representative government that is accountable to voters through regular
elections.81 But the U.S. constitutional system also relies on a politically unaccountable
judicial branch to protect the public from a tyrannical majority. 82 How, then, do we ensure
that the judiciary is sufficiently insulated from the political process? How should the courts
interpret key constitutional provisions to ensure that the judiciary can fulfill its checking
function? Redish provides answers to these questions in the remainder of the book. In
doing so, he provides important solutions to serious concerns, in particular his
constitutional argument for greater independence of state court judges. His book would be
even stronger if he pursued his own logic more fully.
The book takes on four issues about the judiciary’s role in the constitutional
structure. Two are related to the question of judicial independence, and two to how the
judiciary should play its checking role. I’ll start with the two chapters on judicial
independence.
In one of these chapters, Redish considers how we should balance the need for an
independent judiciary with the need to discipline or remove judges who cannot or will not
carry out their duties responsibly. 83 Although Article II of the Constitution specifies the
same “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors” standard for
impeachment for judges as for presidents and other officials, Redish argues that Article
III’s protections for judicial independence should be interpreted to require a narrower class
of impeachable offenses for judges than for other officials. 84 In another chapter, he argues
that under the Due Process Clause, the tenure of a state court judge cannot depend on the
will of the voters, that like federal court judges, state court judges must be given lifetime
tenure, or at least fixed, nonrenewable terms in office. 85 I will discuss this chapter at
greater length because I think it is his most important chapter.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

POSNER, supra note 31, at 362–63, 370–71.
Id. at 46–49, 221–23.
Id. at 65–70, 95–98.
REDISH, supra note 32, at 22.
See id. at 21–23.
REDISH, supra note 32, at 77–109.
See id. at 93–97.
See id. at 110–38.
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Redish’s other two issues are about the proper execution of the judiciary’s checking
role. In one chapter, he argues that courts should invoke the Due Process Clause to override
the Article I power of the federal government to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in cases
involving rebellion or invasion. 86 This is an interesting argument and offers an important
way to ensure that civil liberties are protected during national security emergencies. In
another chapter, Redish argues that courts should override laws when Congress has
deceived the public about the actual effect of the legislation and therefore compromised
the ability of voters to hold elected officials accountable for their actions. 87 For example,
a law might promise a particular substantive result, but the legislature might undermine its
promise through manipulation of procedural rules. Redish uses the Michael H. v. Gerald
D.88 case to illustrate the concern. While the California legislature wrote a law protecting
the rights of biological parents, it also adopted an evidentiary presumption of paternity for
husbands of biological mothers, which could defeat paternity rights for biological
fathers.89 Voters were not likely to appreciate how the procedural rule compromised the
announced substantive right. As Redish recognizes, there are problems with this theory
since the text of all laws is a matter of the public record.90
As I’ve indicated, I think the chapter on judicial tenure is Redish’s most valuable
chapter because it has something important to say about the problem of ideologically
biased courts. Courts are supposed to decide cases based on neutral principles of law rather
than ideological preferences, but as discussed, it’s inevitable that judges will be influenced
by their philosophical beliefs. While we cannot find nonideological judges, we can at least
strive for courts in which neither side of the philosophical spectrum exerts undue influence.
However, as Redish observes, the potential for undue influence is unavoidable when
judges must go before the voters to retain their offices. A judge in a conservative state or
local jurisdiction might be turned out of office because of decisions deemed too liberal,
and a judge in a liberal jurisdiction might be turned out of office because of decisions
deemed too conservative.91 As judges are weighing the equities in the cases they decide,
we don’t want them taking into account the significance of their decisions for their
continued employment. And as Redish argues, it’s not only bad policy, it’s also
unconstitutional. For the Due Process Clause promises litigants that they will receive a fair
trial before a neutral decision maker. 92
This is a very smart argument and a very important argument. The judiciary cannot
fulfill its checking role if it is subject to the same political pressures that face officials in
the executive and legislative branches. The constitutional framers addressed that problem
for federal judges by giving them lifetime tenure, and Redish shows how principles of due
86. REDISH, supra note 32, at 166–98.
87. See id. at 139–65. He derives his argument from an interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1872). See also REDISH, supra note 32, at 145–49. If it sounds as if the book
is a collection of essays, that’s probably because each of the chapters grew out of previously published articles.
See, e.g., id. at 207, 218, 223, 230, 238, 243.
88. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
89. REDISH, supra note 32, at 155.
90. Id. at 159–60.
91. Redish cites as examples that a judge “may be reluctant to side with unpopular litigants or uphold
controversial rights out of fear of sparking voter discontent.” Id. at 115.
92. Id. at 113.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2018

11

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 13
ORENTLICHER, D-FINAL COPY (DO NOT DELETE)

326

TULSA LAW REVIEW

2/15/2019 3:24 PM

[Vol. 54:315

process demand similar protections for state judiciaries.93
But Redish doesn’t take his logic far enough. Even though federal judges have
lifetime tenure, the federal courts still suffer from ideological bias. And that’s because the
appointment process also matters. Redish considers the appointment process and
concludes that we needn’t worry because judges’ sense of gratitude for their appointments
does not raise serious concerns about their neutrality. As he reminds us, once federal
justices or judges are appointed, offending their nominators by their decisions does not
jeopardize their jobs, and there are many examples of Supreme Court Justices who cast
votes different from those expected by their nominating presidents. 94 But even if we
shouldn’t worry that gratitude to their nominators will sway judges, we should worry that
their ideological bias will sway them. If you’re promoting a liberal viewpoint before
today’s Supreme Court, it’s difficult to feel that you’re getting a fair shot, and under
Redish’s analysis, this should be a serious due process problem. A court that has a
conservative or liberal bias is not a neutral court.
What can we do about this problem? A number of states and European countries
offer important answers. As I’ve discussed in a recent article,95 there are three models for
bringing ideological balance to the judiciary. In one approach, judges would need to be
approved by both sides of the political spectrum. For example, in Germany, members of
the German Constitutional Court need support from a supermajority of the legislature and
therefore both sides of the political aisle. Instead of having some judges that are
conservative and others liberal, all judges would bring moderate views to the bench. This
is the reform that Posner endorses.96
In a second approach, we would strive for ideological balance by having an equal
number of conservative and liberal judges. For example, the Senate majority leaders could
be given responsibility for filling half the seats, and the Senate minority leaders the other
half. Delaware and New Jersey do something similar on their state supreme courts. In both
states, one political party cannot fill more than a bare minimum of the seats (four out of
seven in New Jersey, and three out of five in Delaware)97. The German political parties
have implemented their country’s supermajority requirement for approval by designating
seats by political party. The supermajority requirement ensures that the parties choose
justices acceptable to both sides of the political aisle.
In a third approach, we could require that courts decide cases by consensus or at
least a supermajority vote, so justices or judges on both sides of the ideological spectrum
would have to support the courts’ decisions. This approach is common on the European
constitutional courts, sometimes by law, more often by custom. 98 North Dakota and
93. Either lifetime tenure or fixed, non-renewable terms of office would work. REDISH, supra note 32, at 128.
94. Id. at 126.
95. Orentlicher, supra note 20, at 417–18. The remainder of this section draws on this article.
96. POSNER, supra note 31, at 215.
97. In New Jersey, this happens by long-standing custom and in Delaware per the state constitution. John B.
Wefing, Two Cheers for the Appointment System, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 583, 597–98 (2010); DEL. CONST., art. IV,
§ 3. The Delaware approach raises serious First Amendment problems since it restricts eligibility for appointment
to candidates affiliated with either the Democratic or Republican Party. Consequently, it has been deemed
unconstitutional. Adams v. Carney, 2018 WL 2411219, Case No. 17-181-MPT (D. Del. May 23, 2018).
98. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DISSENTING OPINIONS IN THE SUPREME COURTS OF THE MEMBER STATES 17–
20 (2012), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201304/20130423ATT64963/20130423AT
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Nebraska also employ this path to ideological balance. The North Dakota Supreme Court
can declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional only with the support of at least four
out of the five justices.99 In Nebraska, five out of seven justices are needed to hold a
legislative act unconstitutional.100 In my article, I discuss how the three models can be
combined to provide ideological balance not only for supreme courts but also intermediate
courts of appeal and trial courts.101
In theory, one also might achieve ideological balance through the use of a
nonpartisan or bipartisan judicial nominating commission. For example, in many states, a
nominating commission screens candidates and submits a “short list” to the governor, who
then selects one of the candidates to serve. In practice, these commissions tend to act in a
partisan fashion, primarily because the governor appoints many of the commission
members. In Indiana, for example, the governor appoints three of the seven commission
members.102 In Kansas, the governor appoints four of the nine commission members. 103
But one could create an ideologically balanced process. For example, the state senate
majority leader could appoint half of the commission members, the state senate minority
leader the other half, and the commission could operate by consensus in choosing among
the candidates.
It is generally assumed that legislation or a constitutional amendment would be
required for any changes in the federal judicial appointment process, but Redish’s
discussion suggests otherwise. Under his analysis, courts could hold that the current
appointment process violates due process and that it must be replaced by a process that
would generate ideologically neutral courts.104
THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
All three books provide important insights, but they all seem too confident in the
existing constitutional structure. None of the books sees much of a role for constitutional
amendment.
Belco and Rottinghaus reject the view that the accumulation of executive power has
upset the balance of power between the President and Congress. Presidents, they conclude,
exercise sufficient restraint when considering independent action, 105 whether because of
public opinion, the desire to achieve their policy goals through legislation rather than a

T64963EN.pdf.
99. N.D. CONST. art VI, §§ 2, 4.
100. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2. In applying their supermajority rules only to invalidations of legislation, North
Dakota and Nebraska reflect concerns about separation of powers primarily and ideological balance secondarily.
Applying supermajority rules to all judicial decisions does more to promote ideological balance.
101. Orentlicher, supra note 20, at 428–29.
102. IND. CONST. art. VII, § 9. Attorneys admitted to the Indiana bar elect three members, and a member of
the Indiana Supreme Court, usually the Chief Justice, completes the commission. Id.
103. Attorneys licensed to practice in the state elect the other five members. KAN. CONST. art. III, § 5(e). More
precisely, the governor appoints one member of the commission for each of the state’s congressional districts,
and the attorneys elect the same number plus one. Id.
104. For an argument that the Due Process Clause requires ideologically balanced courts, see David
Orentlicher, Supreme Court Reform: Desirable—and Constitutionally Required, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT
29 (2018).
105. One wonders whether the Trump presidency would affect their view.
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more easily reversed executive order, or limits set by Congress in its legislation or through
its oversight.106 Whether or not Belco and Rottinghaus are correct cannot be determined
from their data. As mentioned, we would need to supplement their quantitative data with
qualitative analysis.
Posner spends little time on potential constitutional reforms. In his view, “the
Supreme Court can be counted on to ward off” harms to the country from perceived defects
in the Constitution, as the Court has “been doing for the last two hundred odd years.” 107
In this view, the Supreme Court’s authority to interpret the Constitution in light of
changing circumstances allows it to make the Constitution work properly.108 But Posner
neglects some important counter-examples. Consider in this regard the Court’s infamous
Dred Scott decision,109 and the need for the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments to the
Constitution to address slavery and other forms of racial discrimination.
All of Redish’s ideas are tied to how the Supreme Court should more effectively
promote the existing constitutional system by remaining faithful to the judiciary’s role in
the constitutional structure and the requirements of the constitutional text, such as
prescribed by Article III and the Due Process Clause. He works within the bounds of the
current Constitution rather than considering how it might be improved. Thus, for example,
when he asks whether the judicial appointment process violates principles of due process
because of gratitude judges might feel toward their appointers, Redish observes that it is
implicit in Article III’s very structure—the “gold standard” for protecting judicial
independence—that such gratitude does not violate due process.110 Or when he considers
whether various kinds of congressional retaliation would count as unconstitutional threats
to judicial independence, he tethers his analysis to the protections for judicial salary and
tenure in Article III or other provisions in the Constitution’s text, particularly the Due
Process Clause.111 But in a book on the importance of the judiciary’s role as a check on
the majority, there is a glaring gap. Many scholars do not think the Supreme Court has
fulfilled its checking and balancing role.112 In their view, the judiciary has given presidents
too much freedom to act in excess of the executive’s constitutional authority. Redish does
not engage this important debate.
While all three books suggest little in the way of constitutional change, it is not
difficult to identify ways in which the Constitution could be improved. Indeed, it would
be very surprising if the framers had written a document that does not need updating. As
Posner writes, the framers “were not clairvoyant.” 113
Why the reluctance to embrace constitutional revision? Posner provides one answer.
As he reminds us, Thomas Jefferson worried about the tendency of people to “‘look at
106. BELCO & ROTTINGHAUS, supra note 29, at 175–80.
107. POSNER, supra note 31, at 165.
108. Id.
109. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 395–96 (1857) (holding that slaves were property and not citizens
of the United States).
110. REDISH, supra note 32, at 125–26. This point seems inconsistent with his habeas corpus argument. Why
should the Due Process Clause be allowed to trump the Article I power to suspend habeas corpus but not the
Article II process for appointing judges?
111. REDISH, supra note 32, at 105.
112. ORENTLICHER, supra note 5, at 61–62, 79.
113. POSNER, supra note 31, at 87.
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constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of the covenant,
too sacred to be touched.’”114 Feasibility concerns also are important. It is much more
difficult to navigate the constitutional amendment process than to persuade a majority of
justices on the Supreme Court to implement constitutional change through its interpretive
authority.
Might observers underestimate the potential for constitutional revision? It’s a
difficult process to be sure, but the skepticism can be self-fulfilling. If proposals for
constitutional change are automatically met with doubt, they don’t get a fair shot at
approval. More importantly, constitutional amendments are much more achievable at the
state level, and a state-by-state strategy can eventually lead to sufficient support for
revision at the national level. Indeed, the drafters of the Constitution or its amendments
traditionally have looked to state constitutions for guidance. Important examples include
the Bill of Rights, 14th Amendment protections, and the right of women to vote. 115
Whatever the hurdles to constitutional change, the need for reform is critical. Our
current political system is plagued by inadequate representation for half of the public, too
much partisan conflict, and a failed regime of checks and balances. The important question
is not whether to change the Constitution but how to change it.

114. Id. at 108.
115. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE
LIVE BY 467 (2012).
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